Resources and Strategic Location
The VFD is rich in mineral resources, and its oil and gas reserves constitute 13 and 12 percent, respectively, of Russia’s total hydrocarbon resources. It is not by coincidence Tatarstan is often referred to as “the second Baku.” Additionally, the VFD contains 96 percent of the country’s known reserves of potassium salt, 60 percent of Russia’s phosphorus deposits, and 16 percent of its copper deposits. This region alone provides about 24 percent of Russia’s industrial production, the highest rate of any district in the country; in terms of investment, it provides 15.3 percent
of the nationwide figure. The Druzhba Pipeline System, which starts near Almet’evsk, Tatarstan, and travels through Samara to Belorussia and then to the countries of the European Union, has a distinctly international impact on the region. The Surgut-Polotsk oil pipeline is among many that cross the VFD; five gas pipelines including Urengoy-Center and one export gas pipeline, Urengoy-Uzhgorod, do so as well.8
As a boundary region, the VFD comprises one-third of the Russian–Kazakhstan interstate border. Taking into account the porousness of this border as well as the fact that Kazakhstan bor-ders on Central Asia, the VFD could be considered Russia’s gateway to Central Asia. This location is therefore both strategically and economically important and susceptible to migration problems involving new groups of Muslims.
8. “Informatsionnaya spravka: Polnomochnyy predstavitel’ Prezidenta RF v Privolzhkom federal’nom okruge” [Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District], on the website of the Privolzhskii Faderalnyi Okrug [The Volga Federal District], http://www.pfo.ru/?id=799.
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The value of the VFD is not limited solely to its economic contributions, however. The VFD is of crucial importance in the context of Russia–NATO and U.S.–Russian cooperation, in addition to its importance to issues of religious stability and security. According to a U.S. Department of State fact sheet,
The United States recognizes Russia’s contribution to building a better future for the Afghan people. Our two countries have developed excellent cooperation that supports Afghan efforts to make Afghanistan a peaceful, stable, and economically self-sustaining country, free of terrorism and illegal narcotics. We recognize that significant further international support will be needed to achieve this goal.9
As a result, more than 2,200 flights, 379,000 military personnel, and 45,000 containers of cargo have been transported through Russia in support of operations in Afghanistan. In June 2012 the Russian authorities gave permission for a transit route through the VFD for combined military supplies supporting the NATO operation. To help achieve this goal, the Alliance opened a special transit center in Ulyanovsk—despite the many U.S.-Russia disagreements on a wide spectrum of international policy issues, including Syria, Georgia, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
The Legacy of Islam
The VFD includes six national republics—one third of Russia’s national republics—and is home to about 40 percent of Russia’s Muslim population. Within the VFD there are approximately 2,400 o_cially registered Islamic organizations, as well as the many nono_cial organizations mentioned earlier. Ethnically, Tatars constitute the largest Muslim ethnic group in Russia, with a total popula-tion of about 5.3 million; they are concentrated in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as in some areas of the Volga and the Southern Urals (the Ulyanovsk, Samara, and Orenburg oblasts [re-
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When examining the religious and political challenges that the VFD faces, however, one can-not assume that challenges of one Russian region are applicable to another. Both the VFD and NCFD have diverse ethnic compositions and Islamic traditions as well as a relationship with other religions, primarily Orthodox Christianity. The respective histories of the two regions are very different, however. In both the Imperial and Soviet periods, the Volga region experienced higher levels of industrialization and urbanization than the North Caucasus. A large proportion of non-Muslim groups, mainly ethnic Russians, also settled in these industrialized, urban areas, leading the Volga region to become more secularized as well. Those factors decreased the role of Islam, especially in political sphere. Another key difference between the two regions is that, unlike the
9. U.S. State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “U.S.-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan: Fact Sheet,” June 18, 2012. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/193096.htm.
10. It is also necessary to consider the huge influx of migrants entering Orenberg, whose numbers are di_cult to assess with absolute accuracy.
4 |the rise of radical and nonofficial islamic groups in russia’s volga region
North Caucasus, the Volga region has been an integral part of Russia for a much longer period of time, dating back to mid-sixteenth century Muscovy and the conquest of the Kazan Khanate by Ivan the Terrible.11
This is not to say that Muslims in conquered territories were treated well. Repressive and discriminatory policies imposed upon the former Khanate subjects, including forced conver-sion to Christianity, prevailed from the sixteenth century through the first half of the eighteenth
century. After that, however, Russian policy became more flexible and greatly expanded the rights of Muslims. Numerous wars against the Ottoman Empire, which claimed the role of the protector of Muslims and exploited the idea of religious solidarity, caused Russia to recognize the need to strengthen its own Muslim community’s political loyalty. The Russian imperial government was also interested in decreasing the riots and rebellions that had been so numerous in the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth in the lands of the former Kazan Khanate. The Volga region, which at that time had the largest Muslim population in the Russian Empire, became a unique platform from which this goal could be realized. In June 1773 Empress Catherine issued the decree “On the tolerance of all faiths,” which prohibited Orthodox clergy from intervening in the religious life of other confessions and formally recognized Islam as a “tolerable religion” in the empire. In November 1783, Tatar morzalar (Muslim noblemen) were integrated into the Russian Imperial Army and in February 1784 they were granted rights and privileges equal to those of the Russian nobility. They participated in all of Russia’s military campaigns, including wars against the Ottomans.
Importantly, the first o_cial Muslim organization in Russia arose in the Volga region. In September 1788 Russian Imperial authorities o_cially recognized the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, with its center in Ufa (capital of today’s Bashkortostan).12The assembly constituted a serious attempt, in the midst of the Russian–Ottoman War (1787–1791), to foster a constructive relationship between Russia’s Muslim community and the Russian state, supporting and promot-ing the predominant role of the Orthodox Church while placing at the forefront such principles as political loyalty and religious autonomy. Volga Muslims, especially ethnic Tatars, played a signifi-cant role in the assembly’s creation and development, and the competence of the assembly’s clergy in matters of religion, education, and family law covered the entire Muslim population of the Volga region, promoting its comprehensive integration in the social structure of Russia.
These activities did not prevent some of Volga’s Muslims from undertaking intensive searches for ethno-national or religious identity through the exploration of pan-Turkic ideas,13participa-
11. Even before the conquest of the Kazan Khanate, Muscovy was generally successful integrating the Qasim Tatar Khanate. This khanate, which existed from 1452 until 1681 in the territory of contemporary Ryazan’ Oblast with its capital in Kasimov, was a vassal of Muscovy. Qasim khans and their guard participated in all of Muscovy’s raids into Kazan (1467–1469, 1487, 1552). Qasim khan Şahğäli (1515–1567) was three times crowned as Kazan khan with the aid of Russia. In 1681 the Khanate was abolished and became governed by Moscow’s appointees.
12. In 1796–1802, the assembly’s center was in Orenburg and then was returned to Ufa. It was a collective body led by mufti and several qadis (judges). The first mufti was Mukhammed-zhan Khusainov (1756–1825). In its practice, the assembly synthesized Imperial legislation and Islamic Law.
13. Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) made the first fundamental interpretation of Pan-Turkic political principles in his 1904 work “Üç Tarzı Siyaset” [Three policies]. Akçura was born in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk) to a Tatar family and lived there until he left for the Ottoman Empire.
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tion in the late 19th century Jadid religious and intellectual movement,14or engagement in feder-alism or sovereignty projects.15Nevertheless, the Orenburg assembly was able to develop a solid foundation of political loyalty among ethnic and religious elites as well as among the rank and file Muslims of the region. Indeed, although the assembly’s structure transformed in the Soviet era, it survived the state policy of atheism that dominated in the USSR. The present-day Central Spiritual Board of Muslims (CSBM), also located in Ufa, considers itself to be the successor of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly; in September 2013, it plans to celebrate the 225th anniversary of its establishment with the support of the Russian authorities.
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Tatarstan was held up as a model of stability and tranquility as the Muslim-majority republics of the Russian north Caucasus became embroiled in a separatist conflict that spawned a still-con-tinuing civil war along religious lines. More than half of Tatarstan’s 4m people are Sunni Muslims who have long enjoyed friendly relations with the rest of Russia.17