Table 14: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010

When considering the fact that the TGV runs completely on electricity, and approximately 75% of the country’s electricity is produced from nuclear power; it not only reduces France’s carbon emissions, it also increases their energy independence and allows them to export large portions of their electric generation.

Despite the decline in air and auto travel throughout the country at the intermediate level, there is still a synergy between the TGV and airlines. Two airports-Roissy Charles de Gualle Airport (CDG) near Paris and Lyon Saint Exupery (LYS) have TGV stations in the actual airport. There are also combined services, deemed TGV Air, that allow for international flight travel and TGV travel all on just one ticket. In 2004 alone, Air France, Air Austral, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, KLM, Lufthansa, and United Airlines were are in partnership with SNCF (Arduin and Ni,

2005). Overall, there has been a decrease in car and air travel between the major cities of both France and other European countries due to the development of the TGV; however, synergy between air and high-speed travel still persists at the long distance level.

When comparing these trends to the United States plan, it is quite simple to see the direct similarities. USDOT proposes a plan to only implement HSR into the intermediate level (100-600 miles). Clear emphasis is placed on the continual support of the other transportation sectors. Compared to France, the United States will need to put a larger emphasis on supporting the automobile sector due to the social norms of individualized travel that are much more developed in the US. However, there is still a direct correlation between the United States intermediate distance strategy and the TGV strategy. Each nation shares the ultimate goal to displace the energy inefficient and costly intermediate air and auto travel.

Question Five: Did this case develop transit-oriented development?

As Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) point out, the keys for high-speed rail to both compete against and compliment the air and auto transportation sector depends upon the accessibility of stations to a wide variety of travelers, both those arriving from mass transit or individualized auto. This type of communal advancement is known as transit-oriented development: building around a HSR system, connecting local transit systems to the HSR system and also incorporating green technology throughout the community to make the community as a whole more accessible to a wider variety of travelers.

France has incorporated transit-oriented development by further developing and expanding the local rail system throughout the nation. As of 1985, France has implemented 20 light rail city tram systems in and outside of Paris, with most of them directly connected to a TGV line (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010). Placing TGV stations in airports also enhances transit-oriented development since the travelers do not need to travel to a new destination in order to use a different form of transportation. With the connections to both international and local travel from the airports and light rail systems, France has implemented transit-oriented development at a high degree. The United States HSR proposal has to opportunity to use France as a template in terms or transit-oriented development and connecting a wide range of travelers on an efficient and cost-effective basis.

Question Six: Did this case develop a mixed rail infrastructure?

One of the largest contributing factors to the success of the TGV is the infrastructure that SNCF decided to use from the beginning. From the start, the TGV system was designed to be compatible with the existing conventional rail network; therefore TGV trains can run on a much wider network than the dedicated high-speed lines (Arduin and Ni, 2005). When looking back on Figure 10, that map shows only the dedicated high-speed lines; however, TGV trains are able to travel on conventional lines as well, which created a loosely coupled, successful system of flexible infrastructure.

With the new and separate high-speed lines only being used for highly congested centers, it kept the cost per mile at a near minimum. Albalate and Bel (2010) further explain this cost-effective practice with the following statement:

Indeed, France decided only to create a new, separate network along congested links, and to use conventional services along less crowded connections and for accessing big cities

when construction and expropriation costs were likely to be exorbitant

Expanding on the point of cost-effectiveness, one of the largest economic advantages of the mixed rail infrastructure SNCF implemented was the ability for the TGV to directly serve other countries such as: the UK, Belgium, the Netherland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy (Arduin and Ni, 2005), expanding the economic surplus beyond the French borders. Once again, the United States has the advantage of learning from other countries; the use of the already conventional rail lines should be adopted in the HSR system.

Summary

The French TGV, implemented in 1981, has been a success for a number of reasons. First, the mixed infrastructure, allowing for the TGV trains to run on conventional rails at conventional speeds, paved the way for a cost-effective implementation. The high-speed lines were implemented where they were deemed necessary: higher population centers centered around Paris. Second, the regional implementation allowed for a loosely coupled system that didn’t risk massive up front investments. It also allowed for the federal government and the European Union to recognize the success and assist the SNCF in future investments. Third, the loosely coupled, invulnerable system has been progressively strengthened as a result of the support of the other transportation sectors through transit-oriented development. Lastly, the ever expanding TGV has not only been economically viable in ridership percentages, it also increased the nation’s energy security, allowing for a further economic surplus

from the exportation of electricity generated from the nation’s nuclear plants. The TGV is a proven transportation option that has paved the way for the spread of high-speed rail throughout Europe.

Japan: Shinkansen

Background

The owner to the first high-speed train in the world, Japan introduced Shinkansen in 1964, running from Tokyo to Osaka. Albalate and Bel (2010) state that the regional structure of Japan: large metropolitan centers located a few hundred miles apart with a high demand for travel, favored high-speed rail. Okada (1994) states that approximately 30 million, 16 million, and 8.5 million people live within 50 km of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya respectively. Table 14 provides a detailed map of the Shinkansen high-speed line throughout the country; connecting the major urban centers.

Table 15: Kagyama (2000)

These demographic statistics provide a strong support system for regional high-speed rail implementation.

Despite the high cost that has come along with some funding setbacks, Shinkansen has been both economically and socially successful over time. The state-owned Japan National Railways (JNR) produced the original design and financing of Shinkansen; however, following privatization in 1987, the high-speed rail system is currently managed by JNR and six regional private enterprises: JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, JR Kyushu, and JR Freight (Kagyama, 2000).

Since opening 48 years ago, the Shinkansen has serviced several billion passengers including 350,000 per day between Tokyo and Osaka alone (JR Central). Albalate and Bel (2010) explain that the JR group as whole provides approximately 1,346 miles of high-speed lines. Japan as a whole has about 16,800 miles of rail lines (including

traditional and HSR), with JR companies operating about 12,600 of those miles. Table 16 provides further detailed insight into the particulars of each branch, compiling into the Shinkansen system as whole.

Table 16: Kagyama (2000)

Overall, the Japanese Shinkansen system has been an ever expanding, time-saving, and energy efficient regional travel option between major urban centers; a more detailed analysis will reveal further insight into the level of overall success Shinkansen has had.

Question One: Was the implementation deemed a success?

One of the most important aspects of the degree of success an HSR achieves is profitability, and despite the large initial procured debt, Shinkansen has been economically successful. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) state that the original Shinkansen line, linking Tokyo and Osaka, has been highly profitable, paying back its construction costs within approximately a decade. As stated above, the geographic and demographic layout of Japan created an environment suitable for a high-speed rail system. Consequently, cities with HSR, who have the population density to support the system, have benefitted immensely from the moment of implementation.

Although the cities with HSR stations have only averaged a 1.6% annual increase in population, the employment rate in these cities has been 16-34% higher than cities without, with also a 67% increase in land value (Albalate and Bel, 2010). A specific example of this local development is the city of Kakegawa in which the opening of a new station along an existing high-speed rail line contributed to the opening of five new hotels and boosted the local economy (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010).

Another important aspect of success is safety and reliability. Since Shinkansen opened in 1964, no passenger has even been killed during an accident, despite carrying an average of 340 million passengers per year. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) describe the system that has been so successful:

The Shinkansen employs automatic train control, which will automatically decelerate or halt the train based on the conditions of the route ahead and distance to preceding trains.

The Shinkansen system is also equipped with an earthquake alarm system that automatically brings trains to a rapid halt when seismic activity is detected.

The successful implementation of this advanced technology has undeniably set the safety standard for the rest of the world. In terms of reliability, citizens of Japan enjoy the spoils of one of the most reliable transportation systems in the world. The average delay time for all Shinkansen lines is just two minutes (Albalate and Bel, 2010). On more specific terms, the Tokaido Shinkansen traveling from Tokyo to Osaka- the busiest high-speed line in the nation- experiences an average delay (including delays from rain, typhoons, or snowfall) of a mere 36 seconds (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010).

The last major aspect of success for a HSR system is continual improvement; the Japan Shinkansen has proven successfulness in this category on multiple fronts. First, Shinkansen has dropped its travel time between stops steadily since 1964 despite an ever-growing ridership. This clearly speaks of the correct implementation of technology and

overall efficiency practices. Table 17 illustrates the fact that the overall travel time has dropped, along with continual improvements in trains per hour, trains per day, and passengers per day (Kagyama, 2000).

Table 17: Kagyama (2000)

Second, Shinkansen has also provided continual improvements in terms of overall energy efficiency. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) best illustrate the continual energy savings of the HSR system by stating:

Shinkansen system is estimated to consume one-quarter the energy of air transportation and one-sixth the energy of automobiles on a per-passenger basis. Japan has continually

improved the energy efficiency of the Shinkansen, with the latest, most energy-efficient trains consuming 32 percent less energy than the original Shinkansen trains, even though they are capable of traveling 43 miles per hour faster.

The continual improvements of both travel time and energy efficiency have been major contributors to the overall successfulness of Shinkansen.

Despite the high cost and initial financial setbacks that will be further dissected further along the study of Shinkansen, the implementation of the HSR system has been deemed an overall success. The demographic layout of the country has provided a strong setting for HSR; resulting in high ridership and a short timetable for economic payoff. Due to the fact that no passenger has ever been killed on the Shinkansen as a result of an accident; safety is another large indicator of success, which has been primarily due to the implementation of effective safety technology. Finally, the overall continual improvements of Shinkansen have assured a bright future in a country with an ever-growing economy.

Question Two: Did this case support the USHSR funding approach?

The initial funding approach for the Shinkansen in Japan derived from Japan National Railways (JNR), a state-owned company under the federal budget. The difference between JNR and SNFC of France was the budget. The SNFC, like JNR, was state-owned; however the major difference was that SNFC had a separate budget from the French federal budget. With the JNR falling under the Japanese federal budget, it left the JNR more vulnerable to debt problems. As Gourvish (2012) explains below, the development of HSR lines continued following the 1964 opening:

Further Shinkansen building was undertaken, with government financial support, in

accordance with a policy of geographically-balanced development, pursued via the National Development Plan of 1969 and the National Shinkansen Network Development Law of 1970. The policy, which envisaged some 7,200 kilometres of Shinkansen

This statement provides support to the fact that the initial cost of the Shinkansen was primarily laid upon the JNR.

There are two major factors that led to the eventual 1987 privatization of the Shinkansen rail lines. First, as stated above, the cost between 1964 and 1987 was placed upon the JNR, resulting in a large amount of debt. Kagyama (2000) explains the results of state-run sole funding:

The over-commitments by politicians that led to over extending the initial Tokaido high - speed line terminus end points, and the overestimating of the ridership projections were the primary reasons for the financial difficulties of the JNR and taxpayers

These over-commitments led to political pressure, which in turn led to premature implementation of high-speed lines in low demand areas. Second, due to the high land price along with the fact that Japanese topography requires many kinds of expensive infrastructure such as tunnels and bridges for straight railway, the implementation of the

high-speed system has been expensive (Taniguchi, 1992). Table 18 illustrates the ever-growing cost of HSR implementation in Japan (Albalate and Bel, 2010).