Theme 22. Pragmatics of the sentence

Plan

1. The definition of linguistic pragmatics.

2. The basic notions of linguistic pragmatics.

3. The communication intention as the main criterion in distinguishing different communicative types of sentences.

4. Performatives and speech acts.

Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.

This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they’re talking to, where, when and under what circumstances. Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.

This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. So pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said.

This perspective raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tied to the notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be said. Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance.

These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with.

Pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and the users of those forms. In this three-part distinction only pragmatics allows humans into the analysis. The advantage of studying language via pragmatics is that one can talk about people’s intended meanings, their assumptions, their purposes or goals, and the kinds of actions that they are performing when they speak. The big disadvantage is that all these human concepts are extremely difficult to analyze in a consistent and objective way: e.g. two friends having a conversation may imply some things and infer others without providing any clear linguistic evidence that we can point to as the explicit source of the meaning of what was communicated.

1. So – did you?

2. Hey – who wouldn’t?

In attempting to express themselves, people do not only produce utterances containing grammatical structures and words, they perform actions via those utterances. George Yule gives an example: If you work in a situation where a boss has a great deal of power, then the boss’s utterance of the expression in [I] is more than just a statement: You’re fired. The utterance can be used to perform the act of ending your employment.

Actions performed via utterances are generally called speech acts and in English are commonly given more specific labels, such as apology, complaint, invitation, promise or request. These descriptive terms for different kinds of speech acts apply to syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

One traditional distinction in language analysis contrasts pragmatics with syntax and semantics.

Syntax is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms, how they are arranged in sequences, and which sequences are well-formed. This type of study generally takes place without considering any world of reference or any user of the forms.

Semantics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and entities in the world; that is how words literally connect to things. Semantic analysis also attempts to establish the relationship between verbal descriptions and states of affairs in the world as accurate (true) or not, regardless of who produces that description.

These descriptive terms for different kinds of speech acts apply to the speaker’s communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker normally expects that his or her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both the speaker and the hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding the utterance. These circumstances, including other utterances, are called the speech events. In many ways it is the nature of the speech event that determines the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act. For example, on a wintry day, the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been freshly made, takes a sip and produces the utterance: This tea is really cold! It is likely to be interpreted as a complaint. Changing the circumstances to a really hot summer day with the speaker being given a glass of iced tea by the hearer, taking a sip and producing the utterance cited above, it is likely to be interpreted as praise. If the same utterance can be interpreted as two different kinds of speech act, then obviously no simple utterance to one action correspondence is possible. It also means that there is more to the interpretation of a speech act than can be found in the utterance alone.

On any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three related acts. There is first a locutionary act, which is the basic act of utterance, or producing a meaningful linguistic expression: e.g. I’ve just made some coffee. Mostly we do not just produce well-formed utterances with no purpose. We form an utterance with some kind of function in mind. This is the second dimension, or the illocutionary act. The illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. We might utter [ ] to make a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for some other communicative purpose. This is also known as the illocutionary force of the utterance.

We do not simply create an utterance with a function without intending to have an effect. This is the third dimension, the perlocutionary act. Depending on the circumstances, we might utter [ ] on the assumption that the hearer will recognize the effect you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful smell, or to get the hearer to drink some coffee). This is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect.

Of these three dimensions, the most discussed is illocutionary force. Indeed, the term ‘speech act’ is generally interpreted quite narrowly to mean only the illocutionary force of an utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it ‘counts as’. The same locutionary act, e.g. (a) I’ll see you later, can count as a predication, a promise, a warning.

(b) [I predict that] A

(c) [I promise you that] A

(d) [I warn you that] A

One problem with the examples is that the same utterance can potentially have quite different illocutionary forces (promise vs. warning). How can speakers assume that the intended illocutionary force will be recognized by the hearer? That problem can be solved by considering two things. Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and felicity conditions.

The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force (IFID) is an expression of the type I Vp you that (where Vp – V performative) where there is a slot for a verb that explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed. Such a verb is called a performative verb. In the preceding examples ‘promise’ and ‘warn’ would be performative verbs and if stated, would be very clear IFIDs.

Most of the time, however, there is no performative verb. Other IFIDs which can be identified are word order, stress and intonation: You’re going! [I tell you ], You’re going? [I request confirmation], Are you going? [I ask you if]. The other notions to be discussed here are the felicity conditions: explicit and implicit performatives, sometimes called primary.*

One general classification system lists five types of general functions performed by speech acts: declarations, representatives, expressive, directives and commissives.

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*For a detailed information on the subject See Jule, George. Pragmatics / Series Editor H. Y. Widdowson. – Oxford: New York: Oxford University press, 2002. – P. 49-52.

There are direct and indirect speech acts.

Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function we have a direct speech act:

e.g. Move out of the way!

Whenever there is an indirect relationship between a structure and a function we have an indirect speech act:

e.g. Do you have to stand in front of the TV set?

References:

1. Иванова И. П., Бурлакова В. В., Почепцов Г. Г. Теоретическая грамматика современного английского языка: Учеб. / И. П. Иванова и др. – М.: Высш. шк., 1981. – С. 267-281.

2. Никитин М. В. Курс лингвистической семантики: Учеб. пособие. / М. В. Никитин. – С.-Петербург, Научный центр проблем диалога, 1996. – С. 615-647.

3. Остин Дж. Л. Слово как действие // Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. – Выпуск 16. – М.: Прогресс, 1986. – С. 22-129.

4. Пальмер Ф. Р. Семантика (очерк) = Palmer F. R. Semantics. A new outline / Предисл. и коммент. М. В. Никитина. – М.: Высш. шк., 1982. – С. 87-90.

5. Серль Дж. Р. Что такое речевой акт? // Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. – Выпуск 16. – М.: Прогресс, 1986. – С. 151-169.

6. Серль Дж. Р. Классификация иллокутивных актов. // Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. – М.: Прогресс, 1986. – С. 170-194.

7. Yule, George. Pragmatics // Series Editor H. Y. Widdowson. – Oxford – New-York. Oxford University Press. – 138 p.